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Many scholars lament the increasing complexity ofjury trials and question whether the
testimony of competing experts helps unsophisticatedjurors to make informed decisions. In
this article, we analyze experimentally the effects that the testimony of competing experts
has on (1) sophisticated versus unsophisticated subjects' decisions and (2) subjects' deci-
sions on difficult versus easy problems. Our results demonstrate that competing expert
testimony, by itself, does not help unsophisticated subjects to behave as though they are
sophisticated, nor does it help subjects make comparable decisions on difficult and easy
problems. When we impose additional institutions (such as penalties for lying or a threat of
verification) on the competing experts, we observe such dramatic improvements in unso-
phisticated subjects' decisions that the gap between their decisions and those of sophisti-
cated subjects closes. We find similar results when the competing experts exchange reasons
for why their statements may be correct. However, additional institutions and the experts'
exchange of reasons are less effective at closing the gap between subjects' decisions on
difficult versus easy problems.
The end result of the adversary process is often conflicting testimony from experts-the "battle of
the experts."
Vidmar and Diamond (2001:1134)
In some types of modern trials-such as those involving complex scientific findings or
esoteric economic or mathematical evidence-there probably is no adequate substitute for
actually comprehending the evidence, the arguments of the parties, and the judge's
instructions.
Lilly (2001:70)
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Can expert testimony help unsophisticatedjurors make informed decisions? In modern jury
trials, jurors are frequently exposed to complex mathematical and scientific evidence that
expert witnesses present. Upon hearing such evidence,jurors must then decide the guilt or
innocence of the accused or the liability of parties to a civil suit. Given the increasing
complexity of modern jury trials, as well as research showing declines injurors' sophistication
levels (see Cecil et al. 1987; Lilly 2001), many scholars question whether lay jurors can
understand expert testimony and use it to make informed decisions. Specifically, some
scholars fear thatjurors are not sufficiently sophisticated to process the competing informa-
tion and complex arguments that are presented during trials (Elwork et al. 1977; Hastie &
Viscusi 1998; Mogin 1998; Fisher 2000-2001; Lilly 2001). On the other hand, many scholars
argue thatjurors, despite their lack of legal or scientific sophistication, can assess the value of
particular pieces of evidence and make informed decisions (Kalven & Zeisel 1966; Hastie
et al. 1983; Cecil et al. 1991; Cooper et al. 1996; Lupia & McCubbins 1998; Boudreau 2006;
Boudreau & McCubbins 2008).
To address this debate about expert testimony, juror sophistication, and decision
difficulty, we assess the effects that competition between experts has on: (1) sophisticated
versus unsophisticated individuals' decisions and (2) individuals' decisions on easy versus
difficult problems. Specifically, we ask whether and when the testimony of competing experts
helps unsophisticated individuals make decisions that are comparable to those of sophisti-
cated individuals. That is, when does expert testimony close the sophistication gap?' We also
ask whether and when the testimony of competing experts helps individuals make compa-
rable decisions on difficult and easy problems. That is, when does expert testimony close the
difficulty gap?
To address these questions, we derive several theoretical predictions about the con-
ditions under which the testimony of competing experts should close the sophistication gap
and the difficulty gap. We then use data from laboratory experiments to test these predic-
tions. Specifically, we assess whether the pattern of results that we observe in our experi-
ments matches our pattern of theoretical predictions. This type of research design-known
as pattern matching-is particularly strong in internal validity (Trochim 2001) and is well
suited for our study, given the number of predictions that we derive and the number of
treatment groups that we include. Further, although we admittedly sacrifice some external
validity by conducting experiments, we gain the ability to objectively and reliably measure
our main constructs of interest: sophistication, decision difficulty, and the quality of sub-
jects' decisions.
Consistent with our pattern of predictions, our results demonstrate that when unso-
phisticated subjects are exposed to the testimony of competing experts, they consistently
make worse decisions than do sophisticated subjects. Similarly, we find that subjects, in the
aggregate, make significantly worse decisions on difficult problems than on easy problems.
Thus, the testimony of competing experts, by itself, does not close the sophistication gap
among subjects, nor does it close the difficulty gap in subjects' decisions.
'See Boudreau (2009) for a study of the conditions under which a single expert's statements can close the gap
between sophisticated and unsophisticated citizens' decisions.
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However, when we impose additional institutions (such as a penalty for lying or a
threat of verification2 ) on the competing experts or when we allow the competing experts
to exchange reasons for why their statements may be correct, both sophisticated and
unsophisticated subjects improve their decisions significantly. Importantly, the additional
institutions and the exchange of reasons induce such large improvements among unso-
phisticated subjects that the gap between their decisions and those of sophisticated subjects
closes. Somewhat surprisingly, we find that for the range of penalties for lying and chances
of verification we examine, smaller penalties and slimmer chances of verification can bejust
as effective as large ones at closing the sophistication gap among subjects.
With respect to decision difficulty, we find that although some additional institutions
help subjects make comparable decisions on difficult and easy problems, others do not.
Thus, the additional institutions we impose on the competing experts do not consistently
close the difficulty gap in subjects' decisions. Similarly, when the competing experts
exchange reasons with one another, subjects make significantly worse decisions on difficult
problems than on easy problems. Taken together, these results suggest that the additional
institutions and the experts' exchange of reasons are less effective at closing the difficulty
gap than they are at closing the sophistication gap. That said, the additional institutions
sometimes help subjects achieve significant improvements in their decisions-just not
enough to help subjects make comparable decisions on difficult and easy problems.
This article proceeds as follows. We begin by describing our experiments, which
expose sophisticated and unsophisticated subjects to the statements of two competing
experts before they make both easy and difficult decisions. Then, we make several predic-
tions about how the competing experts' statements will affect the quality of subjects'
decisions (1) when subjects are sophisticated versus unsophisticated and (2) when the
decisions they must make are difficult versus easy. Next, we present our results. We con-
clude with a discussion of the implications that our results have for debates about the
competence of layjurors and the efficacy of our adversarial legal system.
I. CAN COMPETING EXPERT TESTIMONY IMPROVE
JURORS' DECISIONS?
Much theoretical and empirical research suggests that competition between experts reveals
truthful information and improves decision making, even among unsophisticated jurors
(Milgrom & Roberts 1986; Lipman & Seppi 1995; Froeb & Kobayashi 1996; Kim 2001;
Walpin 2003). For example, Milgrom and Roberts (1986) demonstrate that an unsophisti-
cated decisionmaker will make a fully informed decision as long as the interests of the
competing litigants are sufficiently opposed (see also Froeb & Kobayashi 1996). Similarly,
many other scholars suggest that jurors, despite their lack of legal or scientific sophistica-
2 ln legal contexts,jurors know that witnesses for both the prosecution and the defense face penalties for perjury if
they lie on the stand. Similarly, attorneys' cross-examinations (which are a form of verification) often reveal when
witnesses have made false statements.
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tion, can learn what they need to know during the course of a trial. These scholars
recognize that jurors may not possess the formal education or training that is needed to
process the complex, technical evidence presented during trials. However, these scholars
suggest that jurors are able to use cues to assess the value of particular pieces of evidence
and to make informed decisions (Hovland & Weiss 1951; Kalven & Zeisel 1966; Chaiken
1980; Hass 1981; Hastie et al. 1983; Petty & Cacioppo 1984; Cecil et al. 1991; Cooper et al.
1996; Shuman et al. 1996; Lupia & McCubbins 1998; Boudreau 2006; Boudreau &
McCubbins 2008).'
On the other hand, many scholars question whether competition between experts
actually produces these positive outcomes. For example, much legal and social science
research suggests that jurors are not sufficiently sophisticated to process the competing
information and arguments that are presented during trials (Elwork et al. 1977; Selvin &
Picus 1987; Faigman & Baglioni 1988; Thompson 1989; Hastie & Viscusi 1998; Mogin 1998;
Fisher 2000-2001; Lilly 2001). Similarly, many scholars suggest that the increasing com-
plexity of modern jury trials hinders lay jurors' ability to make informed decisions (Strier
1994; Fisher 2000-2001; Lilly 2001). Indeed, these scholars lament the fact that complex
mathematical and technical issues are now commonplace in ordinary criminal and civil
trials. Such concerns over jurors' levels of sophistication and the increasing complexity of
trials have led many scholars to question the efficacy of the jury system and to advocate
various reforms (Sutton 1990; Strier 1994; Broyles 1996; Mogin 1998; Fisher 2000-2001).'
It is this research on juror sophistication and decision difficulty that we build on in
our experiments. In a previous article (Boudreau & McCubbins 2008), we reported the
results of experiments that were designed to test whether and when competition between
experts helps jurors, in the aggregate, to improve their decisions. There, we found that
when additional institutions were imposed on competing experts or when competing
experts exchanged reasons with one another, subjects achieved large improvements in their
decisions. However, the experimental design originally described in Boudreau and Mc-
Cubbins (2008) also allows us to address other important questions.5 Thus, here we use our
experiments to answer two new questions: (1) When does competition between two experts
help unsophisticatedjurors to make decisions that are comparable to those of sophisticated
jurors? and (2) When does competition between two experts help jurors to make compa-
rable decisions on difficult and easy problems?
Although there are many theoretical, experimental, and empirical studies of com-
peting expert testimony, our experimental design makes a number of new contributions to
the literature and has several important advantages. One advantage of our design stems
'For an interesting discussion of trial innovations that may help jurors understand scientific evidence, see Hans
(2007). For an analysis of how judges might help jurors understand expert testimony, see Diamond (2007).
4There is also much interesting research on whether and when certain types of expert testimony should not be
permitted (see Lyon 2000a), as well as research on the accuracy of eyewitness testimony (see Dunning & Stern 1994;
Dunning & Perretta 2002) and testimony from children (Lyon 2000b, 2002).
'Taken together, Boudreau and McCubbins's (2008, 2009) results are, in some important respects, different from
what economic signaling models would predict.
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from the nature of the choices that subjects make in our experiments. Specifically, instead
of asking subjects to make decisions about fictional court cases or to vote for fictional
candidates (as psychologists, legal scholars, and political scientists often do when running
experiments), we ask subjects to make choices about math problems after they hear two
expert subjects make statements about whether answer "a" or answer "b" is the correct
answer.6 One reason that this type of decision is advantageous is that solving math problems
provides a straightforward way to identify correct decisions and to assess whether and when
the experts' statements induce an improvement in decision making. Stated differently,
although it is often difficult to identify when subjects have chosen the "correct" legal
decision,7 it is very easy to tell when they have chosen the correct answer to a math problem.
Thus, although our experiments are low in mundane realism (i.e., on the surface, math
problems do not resemble the decisions that jurors make in courtroom settings; see
Aronson et al. 1998), we gain the ability to objectively measure whether and when compet-
ing expert testimony helps subjects make better decisions.
By using math problems in our experiments, we also gain an objective, valid, and
reliable measure of subjects' levels of sophistication. Indeed, although an agreed upon
measure of legal sophistication does not exist, there does exist an agreed upon, widely used,
and straightforward measure of mathematical sophistication-namely, SAT math scores.
Further, subjects' SAT math scores provide a measure of sophistication that is directly
related to the task that subjects perform in our experiment (i.e., solving math problems).
For these reasons, we collect subjects' SAT math scores prior to the experiment, which
enables us to assess whether sophisticated and unsophisticated subjects are equally likely to
benefit from the competing experts' statements.
Another advantage of our design is that math problems, even though they do not look
like legal decisions on the surface, capture many key characteristics of the information that
jurors receive and the decisions that jurors make in real-world courtroom settings. Thus,
they can tell us a great deal about how jurors in the real world make choices. For example,
in the real world,jurors are not blank slates when they listen to the statements of competing
experts. That is, they often have preexisting knowledge or beliefs about the topics that the
experts discuss. Similarly, subjects in our experiments are not blank slates when they hear
the experts' statements about whether answer "a" or answer "b" is the correct choice
because they have preexisting knowledge about how to solve math problems.
That said, jurors in the real world might be uncertain about their decisions; that is,
they may not know which choice (e.g., guilty vs. not guilty) is the correct one. Similarly,
subjects in our experiments may be uncertain about whether "a" or "b" is the correct choice.
As in the real world, the uncertainty that subjects experience depends, in part, on their
'Note that the two subjects who are chosen to be the experts are shown the correct answer to a particular math
problem before they make their statements; thus, they are made expert by the experimenter. This is common
knowledge to all participants in the experiment.
7See Diamond for a discussion of the difficulties associated with identifying whether and when jurors make "correct"
decisions. Indeed, she states: "To assess how the jtry operates as a decision-maker, we cannot compare the jury's
verdict with some gold standard of truth because no such dependable standard exists... [lIn the end we cannot be
certain that the correct conclisions have been drawn" (2003:150-51).
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levels of sophistication. Indeed,just as unsophisticatedjurors in the real world may be more
uncertain about which choice is correct, so, too, may unsophisticated subjects in our
experiments be more uncertain about whether "a" or "b" is the best choice. And, just as
jurors in the real world vary in their levels of sophistication, so, too, do our subjects, as their
SAT math scores range from 450 (the 27th percentile) to 800 (a perfect score).
Further, in real-world courtroom settings, there is something at stake forjurors when
they make their decisions, but the stakes may not be very large. This is especially true in
low-profile, run-of-the-mill court cases. Similarly, there is something at stake for subjects in
our experiments because they earn money if they make a correct choice and lose money if
they make an incorrect choice. As is often the case in the real world, the stakes in our
experiments are not very large, as subjects either earn or lose 50 cents for each decision
they make.
Further, jurors in real-world contexts often receive factual information, and they
must then make decisions that are objectively correct or incorrect. For example, in court-
room settings, jurors listen to factual information that competing witnesses provide and
then make a decision about whether the accused is guilty or innocent or whether a party to
a civil suit is liable or not. Interestingly, in both criminal and civil trials, jurors are often
exposed to mathematical information that is not unlike the information that subjects in our
experiments receive (Lilly 2001; Fisher 2000-2001).' Like jurors in the real world, subjects
in our experiments receive factual, mathematical information and then make decisions that
are either correct or incorrect. The difference is that we are able to identify when subjects
make correct choices, whereas in the real world, it is more difficult (if not impossible) to do
this. Given the many similarities between real-world legal decisions and decisions about
math problems, there is a close mapping between the psychological processes of subjects in
our experiments and the psychological processes ofjurors in real-world courtrooms (stated
differently, our experiments have a great deal of psychological realism; see Aronson et al.
1998).
II. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
To shed light on debates about juror sophistication and decision difficulty, we conduct
laboratory experiments in which two competing experts make statements to jurors. In these
experiments, we obtain a pretest measure of subjects' levels of sophistication (i.e., their SAT
math scores) prior to the experiment. We then randomly assign subjects to either a control
group or to one of several different treatment groups. We next ask subjects in all groups to
answer binary-choice math problems that are drawn from an SAT math test and consist of
several different types of problems and various levels of difficulty. We tell subjects in our
treatment and control groups that they have 60 seconds to answer each math problem and
'Lilly (2001:71) states: "[Wlith increasing frequency, contemporary juries are faced with sophisticated, highly tech-
nical evidence drawn from such diverse fields as economics, mathematics, statistics, psychiatry, engineering, epide-
miology, toxicology, serology, and genetics."
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that they will earn 50 cents for each problem they answer correctly, lose 50 cents for each
problem they answer incorrectly, and neither earn nor lose 50 cents if they leave a problem
blank.
The main difference between the treatment and control groups has to do with the
conditions under which subjects answer the math problems. In the control group, subjects
answer the math problems on their own, one at a time. The purpose of the control group
is to establish a baseline for how well sophisticated and unsophisticated subjects perform on
difficult and easy math problems when they must make their choices on their own (i.e.,
without an opportunity to learn from two competing experts' statements).
In our various treatment groups, subjects also answer these math problems one at a
time; however, subjects in the treatment groups receive the statements of two competing
experts before they make their decisions. Specifically, before each math problem, the
experimenter selects two subjects at random to act as the experts for that particular math
problem. The experts are then shown the correct answer to a particular math problem (i.e.,
the experts are given knowledge about the correct choice), and they then choose what
statement they would like to make to subjects (statements take the form of answer "a" or
answer "b").' Once the experts choose their statements, the "testimony" of the two experts
is passed on to the remaining subjects who must decide within 60 seconds whether to
answer the problem, and if they choose to answer, whether to pick "a" or "b."
Once subjects make their decisions, we move on to the next math problem. At this
point, we randomly select two new subjects to act as the experts.'" We select two new subjects
for each math problem to ensure that the competing experts do not develop reputations
from one problem to the next." Indeed, avoiding repeat play effects is important because
such effects could confound the treatments we impose. Further, because jurors' interac-
tions with competing experts typically do not repeat over time (e.g., they are typically
limited to the course of a trial), it makes sense to have subjects make "one-shot" decisions
in our experiments. 2
That said, the key to our experimental design is threefold. First, one of the experts
knows that he or she shares common interests with subjects (i.e., he or she benefits when
'Note that the experimenter reads both experts' statements aloud to the subjects in order to prevent subjects from
learning anything about the experts from the sound of their voices. Also, all subjects (incltding the experts) sit
behind large partitions so that their identities are anonymous.
"°In some experiments, we randomly select two new subjects to act as the experts by pulling two subject numbers out
of a hat before each math problem. In other experiments, we randomly select four or more subjects at the beginning
of the experiment to act as a panel from which we draw two competing experts on any particular math problem. Then,
before distributing each math problem, we draw two numbers out of a hat to determine which two subjects on the
panel will act as the experts on that problem. We repeat this procedure for each math problem.
"The total number of math problems that any one subject (acting as an expert) makes statements about depends on
which procedure is used to select the experts, as well as the number of math problems used in a particular
experiment. Across all experiments, the total number of math problems that an expert makes statements about
ranges from 14 problems to I problem. Also, subjects answer between 5 and 24 math problems in each experiment.
We control for this in our statistical analyses, and it does not affect our results.
"For an example of a repeated commtnication game, see Sobel (1985).
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the remaining subjects answer the math problem correctly), and the other expert knows
that he or she has conflicting interests with subjects (i.e., he or she benefits when the
remaining subjects answer the math problem incorrectly). We refer to these as the
common-interest and conflicting-interest experts, respectively. Second, it is common
knowledge to all subjects that one expert shares common interests with them and that one
expert has conflicting interests with them, but they are not told which expert shares
common interests with them on any particular problem. Stated differently, subjects know
that the experts are adversaries, but they do not know which expert's interests are aligned with their
own."' Third, both experts and the subjects know that the experts can lie about the correct
answer to the math problem or tell the truth; it is entirely up to them. The experts' ability
to lie or tell the truth is constant throughout this experiment and is designed to be an
analogy to Crawford and Sobel's (1982) and Lupia and McCubbins's (1998) models, as well
as to many real-world competitive settings.
So how do we induce competition between the two experts within the context of our
experiments? In short, we induce competition by manipulating the ways that the experts
and the subjects earn money. Specifically, the common-interest expert is paid 50 cents for
each subject who answers a particular math problem correctly. The conflicting-interest
expert is paid 50 cents for each subject who answers a particular math problem incorrectly.
So, for example, if 11 subjects (the typical number used in our experiments) answer the
math problem correctly, they earn 50 cents each, the common-interest expert earns $5.50
(i.e., 50 cents for each of the 11 subjects who answer the problem correctly), and the
conflicting-interest expert loses $5.50 (i.e., 50 cents for each of the 11 subjects who answer
the problem correctly). Similarly, if 11 subjects answer the math problem incorrectly, then
the common-interest expert loses $5.50, and the conflicting-interest expert earns $5.50. In
this way, the interests of the two competing experts are strictly adversarial, or zero sum.
In addition to the competition treatment condition described above, treatment
group subjects are exposed to several other treatment conditions in each experiment,
which creates a within-group design. In these other treatment conditions, we alter the basic
competition condition in one of two ways: (1) following Lupia and McCubbins (1998), we
vary the institutional context in which the competing experts make their statements or (2)
3We design our experiments in this way because we are interested in analyzing the conditions tinder which citizens
can learn from competing experts who they do not know. This aspect of our model corresponds to many legal and
political settings. Indeed, when learning from competing experts in a courtroom,juiors may not know which expert's
interests are aligned with their own. Similarly, in primary elections, citizens may not know which candidate (of the
many candidates who share their party label) is more likely to have interests that are aligned with their own.
That said, we could design our experiments differently. Indeed, if we were interested in analyzing the conditions
under which citizens can learn from competing experts who they know something about, we could tell subjects that there
is a 70 percent chance that the second expert has conflicting interests with them. Because the two experts in our
experiments are adversaries, this means that subjects would also know that there is a 70 percent chance that the first
expert has common interests with them. Knowing this, subjects should ignore the second expert's statement, pay
attention to the first expert's statement, and base their choices on it. However, because this design simply turns our
experiments into a test of how perceived common interests between an expert and a citizen affect trust, persuasion,
and learning, and because the effects of common interests are well understood (see Lupia & McCubbins 1998 for a
game theoretic model and experiments demonstrating the effects of common interests), we focus instead on
situations in which subjects do not know which expert is more likely to share common interests with them on any
particular problem.
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we allow the competing experts to exchange reasons for why "a" or "b" may be the correct
choice for subjects. Each of these experimental variations is common knowledge. The
details of how we implement these other treatment conditions are described below.
A. Additional Institutions
In these other treatment conditions, we alter the basic competition condition by imposing
one of two additional institutions on the competing experts: namely, a penalty for lying or a
threat of verification. Both these additional institutions have analogues in real-world legal
contexts. Specifically, jurors know that witnesses for both the prosecution and the defense
face penalties for perjury if they lie on the witness stand. Or, an expert witness may incur a
penalty for lying (in the form of a loss of reputation) if he or she is caught lying while
testifying during a trial. Similarly, attorneys' cross-examinations are a form of verification
that may reveal when witnesses have made false statements.
To impose a penalty for lying in our experiments, we manipulate the way that the
experts earn money. Specifically, we maintain the competition between the two experts,
and we then impose a penalty for lying on both experts. So, in these treatment conditions,
the experts are engaged in competition as before, but we announce to the experts and the
subjects that both experts will incur a penalty (either a large $15 penalty or a smaller $5 or
$1 penalty, depending on the treatment condition) if they lie about the correct answer to
the math problem. We vary the size of the penalty because penalties for lying in real-world
courtroom settings also vary in how large they are, relative to what is at stake for the experts.
For example, the $15 penalty for lying is a very large penalty, relative to what is at stake for
the experts in our experiments. The $1 penalty, however, is small relative to the money the
experts can gain in our experiments. Indeed, the conflicting-interest expert can gain as
much as $5.50 if 11 subjects choose the wrong answer to a problem and lose only $1 for
lying about the correct answer. Similarly, the penalties for lying that experts in real-world
courtroom settings face can be large or small, depending on the nature of the trial, the
stakes involved, and the value that the expert places on his or her reputation.
For the other additional institution-namely, verification-we again maintain com-
petition between the two experts, but this time we verify both experts' statements with some
probability to make sure that they are true statements before they are read to subjects. In
the high (i.e., 100 percent) chance of verification condition, if either expert chooses to
make a false statement about the correct answer to the math problem, we do not read the
false statement(s) aloud to subjects, but replace it (them) with the correct answer when we
announce the experts' statements. If either expert makes a true statement, then we simply
read that expert's statement aloud to subjects.
However, because a 100 percent chance of verification is unlikely to occur in real-
world courtroom settings, we also examine the effects of a smaller, 50 percent chance of
verification. In the 50 percent chance of verification condition, we roll a six-sided die before
the experts' statements are read aloud to subjects. If the die lands on I through 3, then we
silently verify both experts' statements and replace any false statements with truthful
statements when we read the experts' statements aloud to subjects. If the die lands on 4
through 6, however, then we simply announce the answers that the experts choose to
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report, regardless of whether they are correct or incorrect. In this way, subjects know that
there is a 50 percent chance that the experts will be verified, but they do not know whether
the experts have been verified on any particular problem.
To make our verification and penalty for lying conditions even more realistic, we add
a conditional penalty for lying to the threat of verification in other treatment conditions.
We do this because, in the real world, experts must often pay a cost if they are verified and
caught lying. Further, experts' false statements are not likely to be detected or punished
with certainty in real-world courtroom settings. Thus, in these treatment conditions, the
competing experts must pay a cost (of either $1 or $2, depending on the treatment
condition) if they make a false statement and are verified by the experimenter. In this way,
the penalty is conditional (and is different from the penalty for lying treatment conditions
described above) because it is only imposed if verification occurs. For example, in the 50
percent chance of verification plus a $1 penalty condition, both experts lose $1 of their
experimental earnings if the die lands on 1 through 3 (i.e., verification occurs) and if they
had chosen to make a false statement. However, if the die lands on 4 through 6 (i.e.,
verification does not occur) and if both experts had chosen to make false statements, then
we do not subtract $1 from the experts' experimental earnings, and we read the experts'
false statements aloud to subjects. The other treatment conditions in which we impose a
chance of verification plus a conditional penalty proceed in a similar manner.
B. Reason Giving
In our reason-giving treatment conditions, we alter the basic competition condition by
allowing the competing experts to exchange reasons for why "a" or "b" may be the correct
choice. These experiments are identical to the basic competition condition (i.e., competi-
tion without additional institutions) with four exceptions. First, the competing experts are
no longer required to make statements about whether "a" or "b" is the correct choice; that
is, both experts can choose to remain silent. Second, if either expert chooses to make a
statement, he or she must not only state whether "a" or "b" is the correct choice, but also
give a reason for why the answer the expert chooses to report may be correct. Third, the
experts have an opportunity to respond to one another's statements and reasons; that is, the
experts have three opportunities to give reasons and counter-reasons. Fourth, in some
reason-giving treatment conditions, the competing experts must pay a small cost ($1) each
time they wish to recommend an answer and give a reason. Thus, competition between
experts in these reason-giving conditions is analogous to the testimony given to juries,
where witnesses may be called to rebut one another's statements and attorneys may counter
the arguments made by opposing counsel. 4
4As Vidmar and Diamond (2001:1133-34) note: "The adversary system relies on the opposing side to cross-examine
and deconstruct the testimony of the expert to expose its weakness or irrelevance to the dispute. Then, the first party
is allowed to reexamine its experts to rehabilitate them. When the opposing party begins its evidence presentation,
it may call its own experts in an effort to refute the other party's experts. The end result of the adversary process is
often conflicting testimony from experts-the 'battle of the experts.'"
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Specifically, our reason-giving experiments proceed as follows. After both experts are
shown the correct answer to a math problem, the first expert chooses whether to make a
statement to the other subjects about whether "a" or "b" is the correct answer. If the first
expert chooses to make a statement, then he or she must decide whether to state "a" or "b."
After the first expert selects which answer to report, then he or she must also select a reason
for why the answer that he or she chose may be correct. When selecting a reason to support
his or her statement of"a" or "b," the first expert may choose from a brief menu of correct and
incorrect reasons that we provide or write down his or her own reason. As before, the first
expert's statement and reason may truthfully reflect the correct answer or falsely indicate a
different answer. After the first expert selects a statement and reason, we distribute that
statement and reason to the second expert. If the first expert chooses not to make a
statement, then we tell that to the second expert and see whether the second expert wishes
to make a statement and send a reason.
The second expert then chooses whether to make a statement. If the second expert
chooses to make a statement, then he or she must decide whether to recommend "a" or "b"
to subjects. After choosing his or her statement, the second expert must then provide a
reason for the answer that he or she chose. When selecting a reason to support his or her
statement of "a" or "b," the second expert may also choose from the list of correct and
incorrect reasons that we provide or write down his or her own reason. We then distribute
this statement and reason to the first expert. If the second expert chooses not to make a
statement, then we tell that to the first expert and see whether the first expert would like to
make another statement.
We continue this process until both experts have had three opportunities to provide
reasons for their recommended answer. Although both experts can choose up to three
reasons for why their recommendation of "a" or "b" may be correct, the experts cannot
change their statement on a particular math problem. That said, they can repeat the same
reason over and over, or they can choose a new reason each time. In this way, we allow the
competing experts to go back and forth about whether "a" or "b" is the correct choice for
subjects and about why "a" or "b" may be correct or why the other expert may be wrong.
At the end of the trial, we allow subjects to see a transcript of the experts' exchange of
statements and reasons. That is, we have the two experts debate first, and we then dis-
tribute the transcript of the debate in order to save time and reduce subject boredom. It
also allows us to maintain the anonymity of the experts, as subjects do not hear them, see
their writing (except after we transcribe it), or have any other contact or communication
with the experts. We then give subjects 60 seconds to choose an answer to the math
problem.
III. PATTERN OF PREDICTIONS
We now derive a pattern of predictions about how the testimony of competing experts in
each treatment condition should affect the quality of subjects' decisions when subjects are
sophisticated versus unsophisticated and when the decisions are difficult versus easy. We
measure the quality of subjects' decisions by observing (1) the relative amounts of money
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that sophisticated and unsophisticated subjects earn in our treatment and control groups
and (2) the relative amounts of money that subjects earn on difficult versus easy problems
in our treatment and control groups. Indeed, because subjects earn money for answering
problems correctly and lose money for answering problems incorrectly in all treatment
conditions and in the control group, the amount of money that subjects earn is a straight-
forward measure of whether and when competition between experts (with or without
additional institutions or the exchange of reasons) enables subjects to learn from the
experts' statements and improve their decisions.
Specifically, in the basic competition condition, we make the following
predictions.
" Competition-Sophistication Hypothesis. Sophisticated subjects who are exposed to
the competing experts' statements will earn more money than unsophisticated
subjects who are exposed to the competing experts' statements.
* Competition-Difficulty Hypothesis: Subjects who are exposed to the competing
experts' statements will earn more money on easy problems than on difficult
problems.
The logic behind these predictions is best understood by considering the nature of our
experiments. Recall that subjects are not told which expert is more likely to share common
interests with them. Thus, if subjects hear the statement "a" from one expert, followed by
the statement "b" from the other expert, they cannot necessarily learn anything from these
statements because they do not know whether the first expert (who stated "a") or the
second expert (who stated "b") has common interests with them. However, subjects may be
able to infer which expert made a truthful statement (1) if they are sophisticated (i.e., they
can determine whether "a" or "b" is the correct choice on their own, thereby verifying the
experts' statements) or (2) if the problem is easy enough that even unsophisticated subjects
can determine the correct answer on their own. For this reason, we expect sophisticated
subjects to earn more money than unsophisticated subjects in the competition condition.
We also expect subjects to earn more money on easy problems than on difficult problems
in this condition.
In the $15 penalty for lying condition, we expect different results. Specifically, when
both competing experts are subject to a $15 penalty for lying, we make the following
predictions.
* Large Penalty-Sophistication Hypothesis: There will be no difference in the amounts of
money that sophisticated and unsophisticated subjects earn.
" Large Penalty-Difficulty Hypothesis: There will be no difference in the amounts of
money that subjects earn on difficult versus easy problems.
The logic behind these predictions stems from Lupia and McCubbins's (1998) model, which
demonstrates that when a penalty for lying is sufficiently large, then, in equilibrium, a speaker
never has an incentive to lie, and the subjects trust and learn from the speaker's statements.
In the context of our experiments, a $15 penalty is "sufficiently large"-that is, it is large
enough to ensure that both experts have a dominant strategy to tell the truth and that all
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subjects (regardless of their levels of sophistication) know this. t5 Indeed, to ensure that
subjects understand that the experts always have an incentive to tell the truth in this
treatment condition, we give them a quiz at the beginning of the experiment that asks them
to state how much money the experts earn under various circumstances. Subjects, by and
large, answer the quiz questions correctly. If a subject answers a quiz question incorrectly, we
explain to that subject why the answer that he or she chose is incorrect and reveal the correct
answer to that subject. In this way, we are certain that all subjects understand the experts'
incentives in this condition. Thus, we expect subjects to trust the experts' statements and base
their decisions on them, regardless of their levels of sophistication and the difficulty of the
problem.
When a 100 percent chance of verification (with or without a conditional penalty for
lying) is imposed on the competing experts, we expect results that are similar to those in the
$15 penalty for lying condition. Specifically, when both competing experts are subject to a
100 percent chance of verification, we make the following predictions.
" Verification-Sophistication H-ypothesis: There will be no difference in the amounts of
money that sophisticated and unsophisticated subjects earn.
" Verification-DifficultyHypothesis: There will be no difference in the amounts of money
that subjects earn on difficult versus easy problems.
These predictions also stem from Lupia and McCubbins's (1998) model, which demon-
strates that increasing the probability of verification decreases the probability that a speaker
can benefit from making a false statement. Thus, when there is a 100 percent chance that
both experts' statements will be verified, subjects are certain to receive two truthful state-
ments about the correct choice. Thus, subjects should trust the experts' statements, base
their choices on them, and make better decisions as a result-again, regardless of their
levels of sophistication and the difficulty of the problem.' 6
A. Smaller Penalties and Slimmer Chances of Verification
As for the smaller penalties for lying and slimmer chances of verification that we impose in
our experiments (i.e., a $5 penalty, a $1 penalty, and a 50 percent chance of verification),
15'1o see why this is the case, consider the way that the conflictig-iiterest expert earns money in this condition: given
that there are conflicting interests between this expert and the subjects, this expert earns $5.50 if each subject answers
a problem incorrectly. Although at first blush this might seem to give this expert an incentive to lie, note that the $15
penalty for lying %vill reduce this expert's gain of $5.50 down to a loss of $9.50. Further, if this expert lies and all the
subjects happen to answer the problem correctly, then this expert will lose $20.50 (i.e., a $15 loss because of the
penalty for lying and a $5.50 loss because 11 subjects answered the problem correctly). If the conflicting-interest
expert tells the truth, however, then the worst he or she can do is to lose $5.50 (which will happen if each subject
answers the problem correctly), and the best that he or she can do is to earn $5.50 (which will happen if each subject
answers the problem incorrectly). As these payoffs make clear, this expert is always better off if lie or she tells the tnth
about the correct answer to the math ptoblem. The same is, of course, trte for the conmon-iiterest expert.
"
5 As in the $15 penalty for lying condition, we give subjects a quiz at the beginning of the experiment to ensure that
they understand how this treatment condition will proceed. Ttus, we are certain that subjects understand that the
experts ill be verified with certainty in this condition.
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we predict that we will observe differences in the amounts of money that subjects earn,
depending on their levels of sophistication and the difficulty of the problem. Specifically,
we make the following predictions.
" Smaller Penalty/Verification-Sophistication Hypothesis. Sophisticated subjects will earn
more money than unsophisticated subjects.
" Smaller Penalty!Verification-Difficulty Hypothesis: Subjects will earn more money on
easy problems than on diffictlt problems.
The logic behind these predictions is that, under each one of these conditions, the
conflicting-interest expert does not necessarily have an incentive to make truthful state-
ments, in equilibrium. For example, if the conflicting-interest expert believes that a
particular math problem is difficult, then he or she may have an incentive to lie about
the correct answer to the problem. The conflicting-interest expert has this incentive on the
difficult problems because only the most sophisticated subjects will be able to solve the
problem on their own, thereby verifying the experts' statements and recognizing which
expert is lying. The unsophisticated subjects, however, may be fooled by the conflicting-
interest expert's lie or not know which choice to make if they receive conflicting statements
from the two experts. On the easy problems, however, the conflicting-interest expert should
tell the truth about the correct answer whenever there is a penalty for lying in place. The
reason for this is that on the easy problems, subjects do not need expert testimony to answer
the problem correctly. Thus, the expert's lie will fool few (if any) subjects, and the expert
will suffer a penalty for lying nonetheless.
What the above discussion boils down to is an expectation that sophisticated subjects
should earn more money than unsophisticated subjects in these treatment conditions
because they are less dependent on the experts, who may have an incentive to lie. Further,
subjects should earn more money on the easy problems both because they are more likely
to be able to determine the correct choice on their own and because they are more likely
to receive truthful statements from the experts. Subjects should earn less money on the
difficult problems because they are less likely to be able to determine the correct choice on
their own; thus, they are more dependent on the experts, who may lie about the correct
answer to these problems.
B. Exchange of Reasons
Allowing both competing experts to exchange reasons for why their statements may be
correct does not alter the basic competition hypotheses that we state above. That is, even
though the competing experts in this treatment condition offer reasons for why their
statements may be correct and have the opportunity to go back and forth, we still predict
that we will observe differences in the amounts of money that subjects earn, depending on
their levels of sophistication and the difficulty of the problem. Specifically, we make the
following predictions.
* Reasoning-Sophistication Hypothesis: Sophisticated subjects will earn more money
than unsophisticated subjects.
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* Reasoning-Difficulty Hypothesis Subjects will earn more money on easy problems than
on difficult problems.
We make these predictions because, as in the basic competition condition, subjects are not
told which expert is more likely to share common interests with them. Thus, subjects cannot
necessarily learn anything from the experts' statements and reasons because they do not
know which expert has common interests with them. However, subjects may be able to infer
which expert made a truthful statement from the statements and reasons that the experts
give. For example, subjects may be able to identify a flaw in one expert's logic or an
incorrect reason, even if they do not immediately know the correct answer to the math
problem. And, subjects should be better able to identify faulty reasoning if they are
sophisticated or if the problem is easy enough so that the exchange of reasons is clear and
comprehensible to even unsophisticated subjects.
IV. DATA ANALYSIS
When analyzing the data gleaned from our experiments, we first define our main variables of
interest: sophistication and decision difficulty. When classifying subjects as sophisticated or
unsophisticated, we use subjects' SAT math scores, as well as the nationwide SAT math
percentile rankings that the Educational Testing Service releases. Specifically, subjects whose
SAT math scores fall above the median score for our sample are considered sophisticated,
while subjects whose SAT math scores fall below the median are considered unsophisticated.
In terms of the scores associated with these classifications, sophisticated subjects' scores
range from 680 to 800 (the 91st percentile and higher), while unsophisticated subjects'
scores range from 450 to 660 (the 27th percentile through the 87th percentile). 7
When classifying decisions as difficult or easy, we use the results from subjects in our
control group, who answer the math problems on their own. That is, we classify a math
problem as difficult if less than 50 percent of subjects in the control group answer it
correctly. We classify a math problem as easy if more than 50 percent of subjects in the
control group answer it correctly.'" In terms of the ranges associated with these classifica-
tions, the difficult problems in our experiment have between 6 percent and 46 percent of
control group subjects answering them correctly. The easy problems have between 54
percent and 90 percent of control group subjects answering them correctly.
We then estimate an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 9 in which we regress a
variable that reflects the amount of money that subjects earn on: (1) a dummy variable for
7Our results are robust to different specifications of sophistication. Specifically, our conclusions do not change if we
alter the high and low SAT math scores used to classify subjects as sophisticated or unsophisticated.
"SOur results are also robust to different specifications of decision difficulty.
"As a robustness check, we also estimated a random-effects GLS regression, which produced results that are
similar to the ones we report in this article. A random-effects model was used to account for unobserved subject
heterogeneity.
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each treatment condition (i.e., the $15 PENALTY FOR LYING variable is coded 1 for the $15
penalty for lying condition and 0 otherwise), (2) a SOPHISTICATION dummy variable (coded
1 if a subject is considered sophisticated and 0 if a subject is considered unsophisticated),
(3) a DIFFICULTY dummy variable (coded 1 if a problem is considered difficult and 0 if a
problem is considered easy), (4) interactions between SOPHISTICATION and the dummy
variables for each treatment condition, (5) interactions between DIFFICULTY and the
dummy variables for each treatment condition, and (6) variables that control for the order
in which subjects solve the problems, as well as characteristics of the subjects.2" The omitted
category in this regression is the control group.
21
The regression results reported in Table 1 estimate the effects of each variable,
assuming that all other variables are held constant at their mean values. Because most of the
variables in the model are dummy variables that represent participation in a particular
treatment condition, these coefficients do not provide estimates that correspond to real
subjects or groups of subjects. Thus, we use simulations to estimate the expected amount of
money that subjects earn in each treatment condition and in the control group (King et al.
2000; Tomz et al. 2003). Specifically, we estimate the expected amount of money that
sophisticated and unsophisticated subjects earn in each experimental condition, holding
the difficulty of the decision and the control variables constant at their mean values. We
then analyze the expected amount of money that subjects earn on easy versus difficult
problems in each experimental condition, holding subjects' levels of sophistication and the
control variables constant at their mean values. These analyses allow us to compare the
decisions of sophisticated and unsophisticated subjects, as well as subjects' decisions on easy
versus difficult problems.
V. RESULTS
A. Sophisticated Versus Unsophisticated Subjects
Our results for the competition, $15 penalty for lying, and 100 percent chance of verifica-
tion conditions are consistent with our predictions.22 As expected, sophisticated subjects
earn significantly more money than unsophisticated subjects in the competition condition
"°Specifically, the ORDER variable captures the number of math problems used in a particular experiment, as well as
the order in which they were presented to subjects. As for the characteristics of subjects, we control for whether they
have taken a college math class and their year in school, as well as whether their college major is in a math-related
discipline. We control for these subject characteristics because there were small differences in them across our various
treatment groups. To save space, we do not report the results of these control variables in Table 1, but they are
available from the atthors upon request.
"
t We also estimate an ordered probit model in which our dependent variable takes on a value of 0 if subjects answer
the problem incorrectly, I if subjects leave the problem blank, and 2 if subjects answer the problem conrectly. The
results of this model are consistent with the conclusions presented in this article.
' n our previous article, we analyze the truthfulness of the experts' statements in each treatment condition (Bou-
dreau & McCubbins 2008). We find that the experts' propensity to make truthful suttement-s in each treatment
condition is largely consistent with our predictions and with the logic of Lupia and McCubbins's (1998) model.
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Table 1: Determinants of the Amount of Money Subjects Earn
Sophistication x Difficulty x
Treatment Treatment
Independent Variables Main Effects Condition Condition
Competition
$15 penalty for lying
$5 penalty for lying
$1 penalty for lying
100% verification
100% verification + $1 penalty
100% verification + $2 penalty
50% verification
50% verification + $1 penalty























































































NoT-r: Table I displays the coefficients from tihe OLS regression we estimated. The control group is the omitted
category. The results fbr the additional control variables are not shown in this table. These results are available from
the authors upon request. Dependent variable = Amount of money subjects earn on each problem; standard errors
in parentheses; *p < 0.05.
(just as they do in the control group). As shown in Table 2, sophisticated subjects in the
competition condition earn an estimated $0.19 per problem, while unsophisticated subjects
in the competition condition earn only $0.07 per problem. This difference between sophis-
ticated and unsophisticated subjects is statistically significant (p < 0.05).
Our sophistication results for the $15 penalty for lying and 100 percent chance of
verification conditions are also consistent with our predictions. That is, we find that in each
one of these conditions, there is no difference in the amount of money that sophisticated
and unsophisticated subjects earn. As shown in Table 2, sophisticated subjects in the $15
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Table 2: Expected Amounts of Money that Unsophisticated and Sophisticated Subjects
Earn in Each Experimental Condition
Size and Significance
Unsophisticated: Sophisticated: of Difference Between
Predicted Amount of Predicted Amount of Unsophisticated and
Experimental Condition Money Earned Money Earned Sophisticated
Control group $0.09 $0.16 $0.07
(0.04, 0.11)
Competition $0.07 $0.19 $0.12
(0.04, 0.22)
$15 penalty for lying $0.35 $0.36 $0.01
(-0.10, 0.12)
$5 penalty for lying $0.34 $0.34 $0
(-0.12, 0.13)
$1 penalty for lying $0.28 $0.32 $0.04
(-0.07, 0.16)
100% verification $0.26 $0.32 $0.06
(-0.07, 0.20)
100% verification + $1 penalty $0.37 $0.35 $0.02
(-0.12, 0.10)
100% verification + $2 penalty $0.38 $0.37 $0.01
(-0.12, 0.11)
50% verification $0.32 $0.29 $0.03
(-0.16, 0.11)
50% verification + $1 penalty $0.20 $0.16 $0.04
(-0.16, 0.10)
50% verification + $2 penalty $0.29 $0.39 $0.10
(-0.02, 0.24)
Free reasoning $0.27 $0.34 $0.07
(-0.06, 0.22)
Costly reasoning $0.24 $0.35 $0.11
(-0.02, 0.24)
NOTE: Table 2 converts the coefficients from the regression in Table I to expected values for sophisticated and
unsophisticated subjects. These results reflect first differences with all other treatment variables set to zero and the
control variables held constant at their mean values (King et al. 2000; Tomz et al. 2003). Confidence intervals in
parentheses; boldface indicates that the 95 percent confidence interval does not contain zero, signifying a statistically
significant difference between sophisticated and unsophisticated subjects in a particular experimental condition.
penalty for lying condition earn an estimated $0.36 per problem, and unsophisticated
subjects in the $15 penalty for lying condition earn an estimated $0.35 per problem. This
one-cent difference between sophisticated and unsophisticated subjects is not statistically
significant. Similarly, in the 100 percent chance of verification condition, sophisticated
subjects earn an estimated $0.32 per problem, and unsophisticated subjects earn an esti-
mated $0.26 per problem. In the 100 percent chance of verification plus a $1 penalty
condition, sophisticated subjects earn an estimated $0.35 per problem, and unsophisticated
subjects earn an estimated $0.37 per problem. In the 100 percent chance of verification
plus a $2 penalty condition, sophisticated subjects earn an estimated $0.37 per problem and
unsophisticated subjects earn an estimated $0.38 per problem. None of these differences
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between sophisticated and unsophisticated subjects in the 100 percent chance of verifica-
tion conditions are statistically significant.
Contrary to our expectations, we find that smaller penalties for lying and slimmer
chances of verification also quite effectively close the gap between the performance of
sophisticated and unsophisticated subjects. As shown in Table 2, both sophisticated and
unsophisticated subjects in the $5 penalty for lying condition earn an estimated $0.34 per
problem. Similarly, sophisticated subjects in the $1 penalty for lying condition earn an
estimated $0.32 per problem, while unsophisticated subjects earn an estimated $0.28 per
problem This difference between sophisticated and unsophisticated subjects is not statisti-
cally significant. Further, in the 50 percent chance of verification condition, sophisticated
subjects earn an estimated $0.29 per problem and unsophisticated subjects earn an esti-
mated $0.32 per problem. In the 50 percent chance of verification plus a $1 penalty
condition, sophisticated subjects earn an estimated $0.16 per problem, while unsophisti-
cated subjects earn an estimated $0.20 per problem. In the 50 percent chance of verifica-
tion plus a $2 penalty condition, sophisticated subjects earn an estimated $0.39 per
problem, and unsophisticated subjects earn an estimated $0.29 per problem. None of these
differences between sophisticated and unsophisticated subjects in the 50 percent chance of
verification conditions are statistically significant.
Interestingly, we also find that the competing experts' exchange of reasons closes the
gap between the performance of sophisticated and unsophisticated subjects. As shown in
Table 2, sophisticated subjects in the free reasoning condition (i.e., where the experts may
exchange reasons without paying a cost) earn an estimated $0.34 per problem, and unso-
phisticated subjects earn an estimated $0.27 per problem. Similarly, in the costly reasoning
condition (i.e., where the experts must pay $1 to exchange reasons), sophisticated subjects
earn an estimated $0.35 per problem and unsophisticated subjects earn an estimated $0.24
per problem. Contrary to our expectations, neither of these differences between sophisti-
cated and unsophisticated subjects is statistically significant.
Taken together, these results demonstrate that even small penalties for lying, slimmer
chances of verification, and the exchange of reasons close the sophistication gap among
subjects. Importantly, these additional institutions and the exchange of reasons do more
than simply boost the performance of unsophisticated subjects up to the levels of sophis-
ticated subjects; rather, the additional institutions and the exchange of reasons help both
sophisticated and unsophisticated subjects to make significantly better decisions than their
sophisticated and unsophisticated counterparts in the control group.2' The even larger
improvements that unsophisticated subjects achieve are what close the gap between their
decisions and those of sophisticated subjects.
B. Difficult Versus Easy Decisions
Our results for decision difficulty are also largely consistent with our predictions. As
expected, subjects earn significantly more money on easy problems than on difficult
2
'The one exception to this statement is sophisticated subjects in the 50 percent chance of verification plus a $1
penalty condition (see Table 2).
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Table 3: Expected Amounts of Money that Subjects Earn on Easy Versus Difficult Prob-
lems in Each Experimental Condition
Size and Sign~ficance
Easy Decisions: Difficult Decisions: of Difference Between
Predicted Amount of Predicted Amount of Easy and Difficult
Experimental Condition Money Earned Money Earned Problems
Control group $0.29 $0.02 $0.27
(0.23, 0.31)
Competition $0.25 $0.13 $0.12
(0.04, 0.22)
$15 penalty for lying $0.53 $0.40 $0.13
(0.02, 0.25)
$5 penalty for lying $0.50 $0.34 $0.16
(0.03, 0.29)
$1 penalty for lying $0.44 $0.36 $0.08
(-0.02, 0.19)
100% verification $0.45 $0.38 $0.07
(-0.05, 0.19)
100% verification + $1 penalty $0.53 $0.42 $0.11
(-0.002, 0.21)
100% verification + $2 penalty $0.55 $0.53 $0.02
(-0.10, 0.14)
50% verification $0.50 $-0.09 $0.59
(0.46, 0.73)
50% verification + $1 penalty $0.35 $0.43 $0.08
(-0.03, 0.19)
50% verification + $2 penalty $0.45 $0.14 $0.31
(0.18, 0.45)
Free reasoning $0.45 $0.12 $0.33
(0.20, 0.48)
Costly reasoning $0.41 $0.12 $0.29
(0.15, 0.43)
NOTE: Table 3 converts the coefficients from the regression reported in Table I to expected values for easy and
difficult problems. These results reflect first differences with all other treatment variables set to zero and the control
variables held constant at their mean values (King et al. 2000; Tonsz et al. 2003). Confidence intervals in parentheses;
boldface indicates that the 95 percent confidence interval does not contain zero, signifying a statistically significant
difference between easy and difficult decisions in a particular experimental condition.
problems in the competition condition (just as they do in the control group). Specifically,
Table 3 shows that subjects earn an estimated $0.25 on the easy problems, while they earn
only $0.13 on the difficult problems. This difference in the amounts of money that subjects
earn on easy versus difficult problems in the competition condition is statistically significant
(p < 0.05). As expected, the 100 percent chance of verification conditions effectively close
the gap between subjects' decisions on easy and difficult problems. As shown in Table 3,
subjects in the 100 percent chance of verification condition earn an estimated $0.45 on easy
problems, and they earn an estimated $0.38 on difficult problems. In the 100 percent
chance of verification plus a $1 penalty condition, subjects earn an estimated $0.53 on easy
problems and an estimated $0.42 on difficult problems. In the 100 percent chance of
When Does Expert Testimony Improve Jurors' Decisions?
verification plus a $2 penalty condition, subjects earn an estimated $0.55 on easy problems
and an estimated $0.53 on difficult problems.24 As expected, none of these differences
between easy and difficult decisions are statistically significant.
Unexpectedly, the $15 penalty for lying failed to close the difficulty gap in subjects'
decisions. That is, subjects in the $15 penalty for lying condition earn significantly more
money on easy problems than on difficult problems. As shown in Table 3, subjects in the
$15 penalty for lying condition earn an estimated $0.53 on the easy problems and only
$0.40 on the difficult problems. This difference is statistically significant (p < 0.05). That
said, although the $15 penalty for lying fails to close the difficulty gap, it does help subjects
to achieve significant improvements in their decisions, relative to subjects in the control
group. These improvements on the difficult decisions are simply not large enough to make
them comparable to the easy decisions, where subjects make virtually perfect decisions.
Our results for decision difficulty in the smaller penalty for lying and slimmer chance
of verification conditions are mixed. As predicted (and as shown in Table 3), we find that
subjects earn significantly more money on easy problems than on difficult problems in the
$5 penalty for lying, 50 percent chance of verification, and 50 percent chance of verification
plus a $2 penalty conditions. That said, most of these additional institutions still help
subjects to achieve significant improvements in their decisions, relative to subjects in the
control group. Again, the improvements arejust not large enough on the difficult problems
to help subjects make comparable decisions on difficult and easy problems.25
Interestingly, when a $1 penalty for lying or a 50 percent chance of verification plus
a $1 penalty is imposed on the competing experts, the gap between the amounts of money
that subjects earn on easy versus difficult problems closes. As shown in Table 3, subjects in
the $1 penalty for lying condition earn an estimated $0.44 on easy problems and an
estimated $0.36 on difficult problems. Similarly, subjects in the 50 percent chance of
verification plus a $1 penalty condition earn an estimated $0.35 on easy problems and $0.43
on difficult problems. Neither of these differences in the amounts of money that subjects
earn on easy versus difficult problems is statistically significant.
Our results for decision difficulty in the reason-giving conditions, however, are
perfectly consistent with our predictions. Specifically, we find that, as predicted, subjects earn
significantly more money on easy problems than on difficult problems in both the free
reasoning and costly reasoning conditions. As shown in Table 3, subjects in the free
reasoning condition earn an estimated $0.45 on easy problems, while they earn only $0.12 on
difficult problems (p < 0.05). Similarly, in the costly reasoning condition, subjects earn an
estimated $0.41 on easy problems, while they earn only$0.12 on difficult problems (p < 0.05).
These results likely stem from the fact that the experts' exchange of reasons on difficult
problems is either too hard for most subjects to understand or devolves from an exchange of
reasons into an uninformative exchange of accusations that the other expert is lying.
24
These results are estimated first differences of the amounts of money that subjects earn on difficult and easy
problems in each experimental condition. Thus, in a few instances, the estimated amount of money earned exceeds
the actual amount of money that subjects can earn on each problem in the experiment (i.e., 50 cents).
'The one exception to this statement is the 50 percent chance ofverification on the difficult problems (see Table 3).
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VI. CONCLUSION
In this article, we derived a pattern of predictions regarding whether and when the
testimony of competing experts helps jurors make informed decisions when they are
unsophisticated versus sophisticated and when the decisions they must make are difficult
versus easy. In a previous article (Boudreau & McCubbins 2008), we found that competition
between experts tended not to help subjects, in the aggregate, improve their decisions. 26
However, when additional institutions were imposed on the competing experts or when the
experts exchanged reasons with one another, subjects, in the aggregate, achieved large
improvements in their decisions. Because our previous article analyzed only the aggregate
decisions of all subjects, it left open the questions of (1) whether and when the testimony
of competing experts helps unsophisticated subjects make decisions that are comparable to
those of sophisticated subjects and (2) whether and when the testimony of competing
experts helps subjects make comparable decisions on difficult and easy problems.
Our results here address both these open questions. Consistent with our predictions,
our results demonstrate that competition between experts, by itself, does not help unso-
phisticated subjects to make decisions that are comparable to those of sophisticated sub-
jects; that is, it does not close the sophistication gap among subjects. Indeed, we find that
unsophisticated subjects who are exposed to competing experts make significantly worse
decisions than do sophisticated subjects. Similarly, we find that competition between
experts does not close the difficulty gap. That is, subjects, in the aggregate, make signifi-
cantly worse decisions on difficult problems than on easy problems. Thus, the testimony of
competing experts, by itself, is not particularly helpful to unsophisticated subjects, nor does
it help subjects make equally good decisions on difficult and easy problems.
Once competition between experts is coupled with additional institutions (institu-
tions that are common in many legal contexts), unsophisticated subjects achieve such large
improvements in their decisions that the gap between their decisions and those of sophis-
ticated subjects closes. Surprisingly, we find that smaller penalties for lying and slimmer
chances of verification can bejust as effective as large ones at closing the sophistication gap.
We also find that, contrary to our expectations, the competing experts' exchange of reasons
quite effectively closes the gap between the decisions of sophisticated and unsophisticated
subjects. Importantly, the sophistication gap closes because the additional institutions and
the exchange of reasons help both sophisticated and unsophisticated subjects improve their
decisions, with even larger improvements occurring among unsophisticated subjects.
With respect to decision difficulty, we find that some institutions help subjects make
equally good decisions on difficult versus easy problems (e.g., a 100 percent chance of
verification), while others do not. Thus, the additional institutions we impose on the
competing experts do not consistently close the difficulty gap in subjects' decisions. Simi-
larly, when the competing experts exchange reasons with one another, subjects make
2 iThe exception to this statement occurs when both competing experts make truthful statements in the competition
condition. When both experts make truthful statements, subjects appear to assume that both experts are telling the
truth. This assumption largely turns out to be correct and it therefore helps subjects improve their decisions in the
competition condition (Boudreau & McCubbins 2008).
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significantly worse decisions on difficult problems than on easy problems. These results
suggest that the additional institutions and the exchange of reasons are less effective at
closing the difficulty gap than they are at closing the sophistication gap. That said, these
additional institutions often help subjects achieve significant improvements in their deci-
sions, even on the difficult problems. It isjust not always enough of an improvement to help
subjects make equally good decisions on difficult and easy problems.
Taken together, these results indicate that legal institutions, as well as the back and
forth that occurs between witnesses and lawyers during trials, are beneficial not only
because they close the sophistication gap, but also because of the way this closing of the
sophistication gap occurs. That is, rather than simply boosting the performance of unso-
phisticated individuals up to the level of sophisticated individuals, institutions and the
experts' exchange of reasons help both sophisticated and unsophisticated individuals
improve their decisions, with even larger improvements occurring among unsophisticated
individuals. That unsophisticated individuals achieve such large improvements when even
relatively small penalties for lying or slim chances of verification are in place suggests that
citizen juries may not be as problematic as some scholars suggest. Indeed, our results
demonstrate that unsophisticated individuals can make decisions that are comparable to
those of sophisticated individuals when (1) additional institutions are imposed on the
experts, (2) individuals are aware of the effects of these institutions (i.e., they are common
knowledge), and (3) individuals have at least a small incentive to make correct decisions.
Our results also suggest that it is harder to close the difficulty gap. Indeed, only under
certain conditions (typically when the institutions are very strong) do individuals make
comparable decisions on difficult and easy problems. That said, even though the difficulty
gap does not completely close under a variety of conditions, we frequently observe large
improvements in decision making even on the difficult decisions. These improvements are
simply not large enough to make them comparable to easy decisions, where individuals
make near perfect decisions when additional institutions are imposed on the experts or
when the experts exchange reasons. That individuals can achieve large improvements in
their decisions even on the difficult problems again suggests that improving ourjury system
need not involve the replacement of citizen juries with juries composed of experts. Rather,
our results suggest that strengthening our existing institutions can dramatically improve
decision making even when jurors are unsophisticated and even when the decisions they
must make are difficult.
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